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MUNICIPALITIES AND THE INCREASING NEED
FOR LOW AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSING
Inadequate housing has been an interminable and seemingly
unresolvable problem for too long. To declare in 1971 that municipalities
face a serious housing inadequacy is unfortunately to do no more than to
echo the rhetoric of the past.' This problem has historically been
recognized as concerning the quality of existing housing, with emphasis on
slum removal.2 The substandard quality of housing has by no means been
overcome by public and private efforts.3 To the contrary, along with
inadequate quality, the nation now suffers from an increasingly
inadequate quantity of housing for people of low and moderate income
levels.
4
The shortage of low and moderate income housing is primarily caused
by the simple economics of land development. The higher priced housing
is preferred by subdividers and developers as it brings a greater yield per
acre and hence a higher return on the initial investment of the purchase
price of the land.- The price of housing has become so prohibitive that
'In a report accompanying the Housing Act of 1949, S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., Ist
Sess. 5 (1949), it was stated: "The evidence of the current testimony presented during the
hearings . . . demonstrated increasing recognition of the fact that the housing problem is
one of great magnitude and long standing."
2See Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, S. REP. No.
1439, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
3A DECENT HOME, the President's Commission on Urban Housing (1968).
'In the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS TO THE
CONGRESS AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY,
H.R. Doc. No. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. - (1968) [Hereinafter cited as The Douglas
Commission], the seriousness and the national scope of the housing problem are expressed in
the following passage from the Report:
We must put housing on the front burner. We must focus our housing
programs on housing for poor people. We believe in giving local authorities
the tools and the money to get the job done. The states must have an
expanded role, especially in getting sites, providing for low income housing
and in breaking down the barriers of codes and zoning.
Id. at 30. More specific evidence of the seriousness of the housing shortage is the fact that in
Montgomery County, Maryland, 1500 people are presently on the waiting list for low and
moderate income housing. This figure, while deplorable in itself, is not wholly indicative of
the shortage. Many people come into the Housing Agency, see the length of the waiting list
and leave without signing. Interview with David Cohen, Agent, Montgomery County
Housing Authority, in Silver Spring, Maryland, Feb. 13, 1971.
5For example, the Montgomery County Housing Authority reports that the average price
of homes sold last year in the county was $40,000 for new homes and $35,000 for used
homes. And sometimes this subdivider preference is encouraged by zoning ordinances which
impose a minimum acreage requirement. Interview with David Cohen, Agent, Montgomery
County Housing Authority, in Silver Spring, Maryland, Feb. 13, 1971.
much of suburban America has been labeled "tight little islands of
residential exclusivity."'
The harmful results of this shortage are multifold. It forces people of
low and moderate income levels to seek housing in the inner city areas,
thus adding to the cramped and tense situation which already exists.7 It
Increases racial tensions by virtually excluding blacks from the suburbs. s
It prevents much of the low income working force from living near their
place of employment, and it causes by the same effect a labor shortage in
those exclusive suburbs.9 Thus, both those living in the suburbs and those
excluded concur that there is an "urgent need"' 0 for inexpensive housing
in the suburbs.
Since the communities are generally in accord that lower cost housing
construction is needed, it appears that new methods must become
available on a local level to help provide for more low and moderate
income housing." There are four possible methods by which a
municipality could provide more low and moderate income housing
without incurring inordinate cost:"
I. A requirement that developers dedicate some of their land to
the community to be used to provide the needed housing.
II. That, as a condition precedent to permission from the
community to subdivide, developers must contract to provide a
certain portion of their subdivision for use as low or moderate
income housing.
III. An "in lieu" payment, at the discretion of the zoning
'Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 791 (1969).
7See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
'SeeTiE, March 15, 1971 at page 17.
'Mr. Benson, a subdivider in Montgomery County said that a good example of the
labor shortage was that people in his develbpments "were crying for domestic help, but
where am I going to put domestics, on two acre lots-they can't afford it." Interview with
Mr. R. Benson, Developer with W.C. and A.N. Miller, Developers, in Maryland, Feb. 13,
1971. The Montgomery County Housing Authority also agrees that there is a shortage of
labor due to the housing shortage, and [employees] there feel that police, firemen, and
teachers are needed in the community. Interview with David Cohen, Placement Dept.,
Montgomery County Housing Authority [hereinafter referred to as MCHA]. Feb. 13, 1971.
"INTERIM REPORT OF THE MIDDLE INCOME HOUSING COMMISSION FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY. (unpublished)
"In hope of obtaining these new methods, citizens groups in Montgomery County, Md.
have proposed an amendment to the existing zoning ordinance which would, if enacted,
insure much more building in the lower income price range. The ordinance has not yet been
adopted.
"Increased public housing programs, exercise of condemnation powers, and increased
federal, state, and local financial aid all involve expenditure of public money. These methods
are assumed not to be totally sufficient, since notwithstanding their longstanding
availability, the housing shortage remains. The inadequacy of existing methods is expressed
in the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
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commission, instead of the condition precedent (II) or the
dedication requirement (I).
IV. An incentive mechanism where, for a promise by the
developer to provide the needed housing in his development, he
would receive a bonus from the town council.
When determining the legality of concepts such as those set out above,
courts must first determine whether the zoning enabling act of the state
authorizes the municipality to enact an ordinance. 3 If the courts find that
an ordinance is authorized by statute, they then determine whether the
ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power. 4 This involves an inquiry
as to whether the ordinance is "in the general public interest for the
promotion of the health, safety or general welfare of the community."'*
Only the constitutional question 6 will be discussed below as the statutory
question appears to be a less significant threat to judicial acceptance of the
concepts involved.' 7 If a court determines that a zoning commission may
constitutionally concern itself with the subject matter involved, it finally
rules on whether the method used by the ordinance is permissible.
The initial question thus is whether a county zoning council, acting
under the police power of the state,' may legitimately concern itself with
"Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962). The court in Vickers
held that a township ordinance amendment must be "'adopted in conformity with the
statutory requirements." Id. at 140.
"See National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); see
also Sylvester v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 398 Pa. 216, 157 A.2d 174 (1959).
"5County Comm'rs. v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450,454 (1967).
"Constitutional as referred to in this note shall be a consideration of the term as
examined against both state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court has not heard a
zoning case since 1928 when it decided Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
Since that time, state courts have been left with the responsibility of deciding both federal
and state constitutional questions and as a result the two have been merged into one single
question: namely-whether there has been a taking without just compensation. See, e.g.,
Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
1"That which is authorized by the enabling statute is usually all-inclusive of the police
power. The general trend of the legislatures is to enable the municipalities to do all that
which the legislature itself can do under the police power. See. e.g., City of Baltimore v.
Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376, 379, n. 4 (1969). Thus the two questions seem to merge.
In any case, the statutory question, if different from the constitutional is easily resolved by
amendment which would be forthcoming if municipalities wanted statutory power not
presently existing.
"~ln most states, the power of a county in exercising its zoning function is as broad as
possible and tantamount to the power of the state itself. See, e.g., Scull v. Montgomery
County Citizens League, 249 Md. 271, 239 A.2d 92 (1968); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311
Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). Therefore, if the state may constitutionally concern itself
with this subject matter, so may the county council or municipality, whose authority is
concurrent in this regard to that of the state. But see Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa.
438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949).
low and moderate 9 income housing within proper constitutional
confines.20 State efforts to provide low income housing are
constitutionally permissible as an exercise of the police power because the
purpose of the expenditure is to clear up blight and slum conditions. 21 The
removal of slums has been held a constitutional exercise of the police
power because it is for the general welfare, and betterment of the health,
safety, and morals of the community.Y
State concern with moderate income housing has met judicial
objection. In Opinion of the Justices,23 the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts ruled, in the form of an advisory opinion, on the
constitutionality of a bill authorizing a state housing agency to finance the
building and rehabilitation of low and moderate income housing. The
court advised that insofar as the bill provided for moderate income
housing, it was considered the spending of public monies for private
purposes and therefore, was unconstitutional since it was not confined to a
public purpose.24 The original justification for state concern with low
income housing was that the state was acting in the general welfare by
removing slums and blighted areas.2 5 But this justification was not
thought to be present when the state was legislating to provide for
moderate income housing, because providing moderate income housing
was not considered helpful in clearing up blight and slum conditions.
26
"Moderate income has had trouble defining itself with respect to housing. No dollar
figure is available but has been defined as "any housing subsidized by any federal or state
government under the program. ... MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B § 20 (Cum. Supp.
1970).
2*What is permissible under the police power is limited to the needs of the community.
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Scull v.
Montgomery County Citizens League, 249 Md. 271,239 A.2d 92 (1968).
2'None of the following cases which use blight as a justification for state concern with
low income housing define the term. Blight is used interchangably with slum, and both are
used to refer to those undesirable conditions, whose elimination would be in the general
welfare of the community. See, e.g., Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29,
175 S.E.2d 665 (1970). In In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 74, 389 P.2d 538, 61 Cal. 2d 21 (1964), an area with a high incidence of crime, poverty,
fire, and disease was referred to as a blighted area.
"Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970). This
case holds that state concern with enhancing the availability of low income housing for sale
or rental is a valid public purpose and thus justified under the police power where the purpose
is to clear up blighted areas. See also Opinion of the Justices, 351 Mass. 716, 219 N. E.2d 18
(1966).
2351 Mass. 716, 219 N.E.2d 18 (1966).
2 lhe court stated that "so far as the . . . bill is to provide housing for families of
moderate income, the bill does not appear to be confined to a public purpose." 219 N.E.2d
at 26.
2Opinion of the Justices, 351 Mass. 716, 219 N.E.2d 18 (1966); Martin v. North
Carolina Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970).
"That the court thought this justification was absent in the legislation in question is
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In Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England
Merchants National BankY the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
reversed its earlier opinion as to the constitutionality of state cohcern with
moderate income housing, and held that public monies could
constitutionally be expended to facilitate the availability of moderate
income housing. It was successfully urged upon the court that the only
method by which to permanently achieve an elimination of blighted areas
was "to mix families of varied economic means [which would] provide for
the prevention and hence the 'permanent elimination' of slum conditions
in the project. ' 2 The opinion does, not explain exactly how mixing
families of varied economic means will add permanence to the removal of
blight, l6ut the intimation is that the presence of the moderate income
family would induce the low income families to improve their property.
Absent the presence of the moderate income family, the lower income
family and thus the neighborhood would remain unimproved and subject
to blight.21
The rationale of the Massachusetts court presupposes a blight
problem by which concern for moderate income housing may be justified.
In many suburban areas in the country there exists a serious inadequacy
of moderate income housing, but where there is no appreciable problem of
blight." And if the shortage in these areas is to be overcome by zoning
enactments, justification must be sought in criteria other than the blight
oriented one used in Massachusetts.
3 '
An acute shortage of housing may, standing alone, be so detrimental
to the general welfare that a zoning board is acting within the police power
when it attempts to alleviate the problem. This justification would be
independent of the blight oriented concept. Shortage of housing was the
apparent in the statement that "[t]his is not a bill aimed to clear blighted areas or remove
slums," 219 N.E.2d at 24.
2 Mass. - 249 N.E.2d 599 (1970).
2S1d. at 607.
"Where two low income people own adjacent property, they are both economically
better off if neither one improves his property than if only one improves his property. This
situation, taken in its aggregate, results in an entire neighborhood in a state of disrepair and
unimprovement. See Davis and Winston, The Economics of Urban Renewal. 26 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 105, 106-112 (1961). This situation could be alleviated by
mixing low income families with moderate income families. Section 7(a) of the act in
question had this as a goal by stating that "income limits shall be sufficiently flexible to
avoid undue economic homogenity among tenants." St. 1966, c. 708 § 7(a) as amended by
St. 1968, c. 709.
3*For example, in Montgomery County, Md., Fairfax County, Va., and Westchester
County, N.Y. there is not a slum problem but there exists an acute shortage of housing.
3'While blight was the controlling justification in Massachusetts Housing. see 249
N.E.2d at 601, n.4, where the housing shortage existing in Cambridge was used to further
justify the purpose of the act, and shortage, as opposed to blight removal, is the problem
which exists in many suburban areas like Montgomery County, Maryland.
NOTES
sole justification for Vermont legislation which made credit available for
those desiring to construct homes in 'that state.3 2 In Vermont Home
Mortgage Credit Agency v. Montpelier National Bank3 this legislation
was considered a valid public purpose. Housing shortage, not blight
removal or poverty,3 was the legislative purpose which placed this act
within the legitimate scope of the police and spending powers.3,5 Vermont
Home Mortgage indicates the possibility of judicial acceptance of housing
shortage as a justification for state concern with moderate income
housing.
In view of the existing housing shortage, 3 it is arguable that state
activity to provide more moderate income housing is in the general welfare
and as such should be held to be a valid exercise of the police power in
states other than Vermont. In Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp.,
37
the Supreme Court of North Carolina based its approval of that state's
mortgage act on the fact that it was directed toward "persons or families
of lower income" 3 with emphasis on clearing up blight and slum
conditions.39 Yet, there is language in the opini'on which might show the
court's willingness to consider favorably the validity of governmental
concern with moderate income housing based upon a shortage of that
housing.4"
Thus, courts could justify state concern with moderate income housing
either on its propensity to clear up blight, or simply because it is so
UVERMONT STAT. ANN. tit. 10, ch. IB § 291 (Cum. Supp. 1970-7 1).
3 Vt. _ 262 A.2d 445 (1970). This case upheld an act creating an agency
empowered to acquire first mortgage loans on dwelling properties located within the state.
uThe court in Vermont Home Mortgage does not mention a low income limitation.
3sThe court took judicial notice of the fact that "[r]ising costs of money, here and
elsewhere, have placed capital funds for home construction in critically short supply." 262
A.2d at 449, citing Klaman, Public/Private Approaches to Urban Mortgage and Housing
Problems, 32 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 250 (1967), which speaks of the near
credit crisis of 1966, which had adverse effects on the housing industry.
31lf the credit situation in 1966 was adverse enough to the general welfare to sustain the
Vermont act under the police power of the state, the credit situation in 1971 would lead to a
similar if not more strongly worded statement. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT,
113-17 (1970).
37277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970).
3,1d. at 667.
31As such, the North Carolina court follows the reasoning of the Massachusetts court,
and has blight and slum removal as the justification of its housing act.
"'That the North Carolina court would be receptive to change in this regard is implicit in
the elasticity the court wrote into the following passage of the opinion: "A slide-rule
definition to determine public purpose for all time can not be formulated; the concept
expands with the population, economy, scientific knowledge and changing conditions." 175
S.E.2d at 672 (emphasis added). In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), Mr. Justice Sutherland said of the police power that it "is not capable of precise
delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions." Id. at 387.
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desperately needed .4 In either case it is apparent that moderate income
housing is a proper subject for the concern of a municipality under the
police power of the state. The only question now remaining is what
method can best be employed by the municipality to obtain the needed
housing.
REQUIRING THE DEVELOPER TO DEDICATE A PORTION OF HIS LAND TO
THE COMMUNITY So THAT THEY MAY USE IT TO PROVIDE Low AND
MODERATE INCOME HOUSING
Dedication 2 of land to the community by the subdivider has been
traditionally utilized by municipalities to defray the cost of subdivision.
The rationale for requiring dedication is that the subdivider who reaps
profit from the subdivision should pay for the costs which his activities
create such as roads,4 3 parks,4 4 and sometimes schools." Since dedication
involves the transfer of property from a private citizen to the public, it is
subject to the constitutional limitation that it not constitute a taking of
private property without just compensation.4 6 If the courts find that the
activity of the subdivider creates a municipal need, the subdivider may be
required to give land for the fulfillment of the need which he has created,
and no compensation need be given the subdivider.
47
The most often quoted test for determining the constitutionality of
these dedications is that advanced in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v.
Village of Mount Prospect's In Pioneer a developer challenged the
"Of the two independent justifications for state efforts to provide moderate income
housing, it is suggested that courts considering the question use the justification advanced by
the Massachusetts court. Vermont's justification, shortage, is based on a present credit
shortage. Credit could ease and with it so would the shortage of middle income housing, and
with this would go much of the concern over the housing problem existing today, and this
would in all probability be far in advance of the permanent elimination of blight. It thus
would seem that justifying moderate income housing with a concern for blight would better
speak to the challenge of the Douglas Commission. Note 4 supra.
"2 Dedication occurs where the subdivider conveys title to a certain part of his land to the
community. See 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 19.25 (1968).
43E.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
44E.g., Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1966).
45E.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
But see Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 I11. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961).
"1See, e.g., Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966). See also Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing
Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions,
73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
'7Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966).
4822 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
required dedication of land for use as recreational and school sites. The
developer argued that the requirement was tantamount to an
unconstitutional taking in violation of both the state and federal
constitutions. In sustaining his challenge, the court held that land
dedication requirements would be enforced against the subdivider only
where the need for the land is "specifically and uniquely attributable to
his activity and which would otherwise be cast upon the public.""
An exact definition of "specifically and uniquely attributable" was
not advanced in Pioneer. It has been applied both restrictively, and
liberally. 0 The test was given a restrictive application in Pioneer,51 and has
been similarly applied by other courts. 52 Where restrictively applied the
test used would probably not permit lower cost housing exactions.5 3 The
court in Pioneer made it clear that the problem of school space is
community-wide and as such is one that "the subdivider should not be
obliged to pay the total cost of remedying, and to so construe the statute
would amount to an exercise of the power of eminent domain without
compensation." 4 This language leaves little room for the contemplated
dedication. The shortage of housing is a nation-wide problem and the
reasoning here would indicate that if land for schools could not be
exacted, then land for lower income housing surely could not. 5
Other jurisdictions have applied the Pioneer test less restrictively. In
"Id. at 801 citing Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230,
233 (1960).
5'One jurisdiction allows no exactions. City and County of Denver v. Denver Buick,
Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1960).
5 The developer in Pioneer conceded that his activity as a developer would result in an
additional 250 housing units in the community and would thus "aggravate the existing need
for additional school and recreational facilities .. " 176 N.E.2d at 802. This aggravation
of the existing need was not enough to justify requiring the developer to pay the cost this need
created.
2See, e.g. Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, - R.I. _ 264 A.2d 910 (1970). In
Ansuini, the Rhode Island Court adopted the Pioneer test and construed it restrictively so as
to invalidate an ordinance requiring a dedication of 7% of the proposed development land as
park sites, reasoning that it was not possible for the developers activity to always specifically
create a need for exactly 7% of this land, and as such said that the dedication requirement
was "arbitrary on its face." Id. at 914.
51n Pioneer, the court based its refusal to sustain the exaction on Ayres v. City Council,
34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d I (1949). Ayres held that while requiring a developer to donate land
for streets inside the development would be permissible, to require him to provide a major
thoroughfare would be unconstitutional as the need for the major thoroughfare arose from
the activity of the entire community. See also People ex rel. Exchange Bank v. City of Lake
Forest, 40 111. 2d 281, 239 N.E.2d 819 (1968).
"176 N.E.2d 799, 802.
"5lf, even where a developer's activity admittedly aggravates the existing need, he is not
responsible for the cost, he surely would not be held responsible for the cost of low and
moderate income housing, which need he has not, strictly speaking, aggravated. But see Note
70, infra for a possible approach by more liberal courts in this regard.
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Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted the Pioneer test, 57 but would not do so "restrictively." 5 The court
thus used the same test as Pioneer, but allowed the type of land exaction
which Pioneer refused.59 Whether the slight liberalization of the test made
in Jordan would make room for the low-moderate housing land exaction
is questionable."0 It could be argued to the, less restrictive courts in this
regard6' that the need for low and moderate income housing is, in a sense,
'attributable' to the activity of the aggregate of subdividers1 2 There is
only a limited supoly of land remaining to be subdivided in any given area.
It coutd thus be argued that to the extent that subdividers use the
remaining land for housing, projects which are not low income oriented,
they are aggravating the housing problem-the need for low income
housing being more acutely felt with the diminishing supply of land
available in the area.
6 3
-128 Wis. 2d 608,137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
51Speaking of the Pioneer test the Wisconsin Court in Jordan stated that "We deem this
to be an acceptable yardstick to be applied." 137.N.W.2d at 447.
"'Id.
"See also Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966), where the New York Court applied the same test but reached the
opposite result.
10Even with the slight liberalization, the activity of the subdivider must be the sine qua
non of the need for which the land is taken. lh Jordan, the court stated:
...the municipality may require him to dedicate part of his platted land
to meet a demand to which the municipality would not have been put but
for the influx of people into the community to occupy the subdivision lots.
137 N.W.2d at 448 (emphasis added).
"See, e.g., Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d
442 (1965).
2
1n both Jordan, and Jenad, Inc. the courts .considered the activity of the aggregate
of subdividers and developers, whereas in Pioneer, only the activity of the one subdivider
could be considered. See text accompanying notes 55, 63, 66, supra.
6'This argument has obviously never been accepted since this dedication requirement,
not yet enacted, has never been tested in court. It would appear, however, to be consonant
with a liberal interpretation of the "specifically and uniquely attributable to" test, especially
when considered in view of the critical need for the housing. See. e.g., Petterson v. City of
Naperville, 9 I11. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956):
The privilege of the individual to use his property as he pleases is subject
always to a legitimate exercise of the police power under which new
burdens may be imposed upon property and new restrictions placed upon
its use when the public welfare demands.
Id. at 379 (emphasis added). 'This dedication requirement could also be justified by an
analogy to the tax imposed upon the severance and dissipation of rare minerals. Cf. Soto v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 142 W. Va. 373, 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956).
NOTES
REQUIRING DEVELOPERS TO DEVELOP PART OF THEIR LAND WITH
HOUSES WITHIN A PRICE RANGE ACCEPTABLE TO LOW AND MODERATE
INCOMES
If, when an individual intended to develop property, he could be
required to develop a fraction 4 of it as low or moderate income housing,
the urgent need for this housing could be met while avoiding the serious
constitutional challenge available to developers if they were required to
dedicate" the land. Avoidance of the constitutional challenge would be
accomplished by leaving title to the land with the developer,6 7 and by
permitting him to retain all profit he makes from the low and moderate
income units. With title to this land remaining in the developer, the
requirement here would be referred to as a condition precedent", to
subdivision as opposed to a dedication.
Zoning requirements of this nature are upheld by the courts if they are
justified under the police power for the general welfare of the
community. 9 That the public would benefit from the imposition of this
requirement upon the developer does not require that the police power
manifest itself by way of eminent domain since subdividing is not
considered an absolute right.70 Thus, in order to secure the privilege of
having a subdivision plat recorded, the developer may be required to
comply with reasonable conditions imposed by the municipality. Such
"The proposed fraction in Montgomery County would be as follows:
Minimum Percentage







The increase in set increments is proportionate to a percent increase of allowable commercial
use.
"Text accompanying notes 48-69, supra.
"3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 19.25 (1968).
71d.
"As generally defined, a condition precedent is that act to be performed by both or
either party before the agreement or contract becomes binding. Rogers v. Maloney, 85 Ore.
61, 165 P. 357, 358 (1917).
"See generally Stewart v. Stone, 130 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1961); Vickers v. Township
Comm., 37 N.J . 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
70E.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31,207 P.2d 1 (1949); Billings Property, Inc. v.
Yellow Stone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964). See also Reps and Smith, Control
of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYR. L. REV. 405 (1963); Note, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 974
(1966).
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compliance does not constitute a confiscation despite the fact that some
benefit is derived by the municipality.
7'
Thus, requiring subdividers to develop part of the subdivision for use
as low and moderate income housing is permissible if it is reasonable to do
so under the police power.7 2 A determination of reasonableness starts with
the proposition that an ordinance embodying this condition, like all
others, enjoys a presumption of validity and reasonableness, 7 and the
burden is upon the developer to show that there is no rational basis for the
imposition of this condition under the police power.74
Since title to the land involved would remain with the developer or
subdivider, a zoning ordinance of this nature does not effect an actual
confiscation of property, and thus it would only be held unreasonable if it
so diminished the value of the property as to be considered confiscatory in
nature. 75 This consideration begins with an economic determination of
what value would be taken from developers if this requirement were
imposed. 76 While a decrease in value is not controlling as to the validity of
7'E.g., Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
72See generally Billings Property, Inc. v. Yellow Stone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d
182 (1964). And in determining reasonableness it is important to keep in mind the urgent
need for houses; as what is reasonable depends upon public need. See Petterson v. City of
Naperville, 9 II1. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
7E.g., Allion v. City of Toledo, 99 Ohio St. 416, 124 N.E. 237 (1919). In Allion the
Supreme Court of Ohio said:
Unless there is a clear and palpable abuse of power the court will not
substitute its judgment for legislative discretion. The local authorities
acquainted with local conditions are presumed to know what the needs of
the community demand.
Id. at 238. See also Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
7 E.g., Billings Property, Inc. v. Yellow Stone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182
(1964). Exemplary of state court attitude to enactments of the legislature is the expressed
commitment of the Montana Supreme Court "to uphold enactments of the Legislature if
there is any rational basis on which they can be upheld. ... Id. at 188 [emphasis of the
court].
75And this diminution of value would have to be so great as to make the property
unusable for any reasonable purpose. Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222,
15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
7 Decreased value of property will not per se invalidate the ordinance. Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915). In Hadacheck the location of a brick manufacturer's
business was zoned for residential use only. The value of his land for residential purposes was
estimated to be $60,000, as opposed to $800,000 when used for his brick business. This
enormous decrease in property value was not enough to invalidate the ordinance. See also
Little v. Young, - Misc. _ 82 N.Y.S.2d 909, affd 274 App. Div. 1005, 85 N.Y.S.2d
41, affd 299 N.Y. 699, 87 N.E.2d 74 (1948), where the court said:
Properly administered zoning power . . . may legally leave in its wake
scars of lost profits to land owners as well as restricted uses causing
inconvenience and disappointment but that is the exact meaning of zoning.
Id. at 916.
an ordinance, 77 it does appear to be a proper starting place to determine
whether an ordinance is confiscatory.
7
The developer's main concern is that the part of the development not
used for low and moderate income housing would suffer in terms of its
marketability 79 where it is proximate to that part of the development
occupied by the economically disadvantaged. 80 While perhaps
substantially affecting the value, this externality"' can, to some extent, be
architecturally overcome,82 and to this even the developers agree. s3The possibility of architectural alleviation of the externality may not
be as great where the public knows in advance that the development must
"1See Wulfshon v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120, 210 N.Y.S. 941 (1925). In
Wulfshon the court said:
It is not an effective argument against these ordinances, if otherwise
valid, that they limit the use and may depreciate the value of appellant's
premises. That frequently is the effect of police regulation and the general
welfare of the public is superior in importance to the pecuniary profits of
the individual.
Id. at 124.
7"See Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560,42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). In Simon it
was held that profit loss to the developer due to a minimum lot size requirement, while not
controlling, was entitled to consideration.
"That part of the development not used for the low-moderate housing would be
marketed to those of higher incomes. If this latter group is aware that the development has
lower income people living there, they are less willing to purchase. As such, the marketability
suffers. For a discussion of the exclusionary tendency of the suburban market, see Sager,
Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 767 (1969).
"When Mr. R. Benson was asked what the effect would be on the marketability of the
rest of the project he replied "It might just kill it." And as Sterling Park, a development in
Northern Virginia, put it in an advertisement "when you buy a house, you buy a
community."
This unfortunate reality of the housing industry has even been given judicial notice. In
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, -
Mass. - 249 N.E.2d 599 (1970), the court approved rental rates for the moderate income
housing substantially below the fair market rental rate. This rate reduction was to serve as an
inducement to "counteract the fact that people do not normally choose to live in projects or
neighborhoods with people of substantially lower incomes. ... Id. at 606.
"Externality as here used, means the adverse effect that the presence of the low income
family will have uhon the saleability of the rest of the development. As classified it is an
"external diseconomy." See, e.g., P. SAMNIUELSON, EcONOMIcs 453-54 (8th ed. 1967).
"in the nearby Laytonia housing development in Gaithersburg, Maryland homes range
from $15,000 to $65,000. But because the architecture is subtle and the project is well
landscaped, it is difficult to spot the less expensive homes. Early in 1970, residents of the
Laytonia project heard of the possibility that a low income project was going to be started
nearby. They called a meeting to deplore the possibility of poor people living nearby only to
discover that many who lived at the development itself were on federal subsidy.
"aMr. Benson indicated that it would be possible and lucrative to put the very rich and
the very poor together and that he could please both in the process. Note 9, supra.
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include a certain number of lower income units.' It would seem therefore
that the economic effect on the development cannot in this case be
accurately determined in advance of implementation of such an
ordinance. 5 Where damage to property is at best speculative in nature as
it is here, the courts are disposed to dismiss the challenge." Thus since
value loss87 is impossible to show, it appears that the developers cannot
meet their judicially imposed burden of showing that they would be
unreasonably harmed by the adoption of an ordinance of this nature.8s
PAYMENT IN LIEU OF DEDICATION OF LAND OR OF THE CONDITION
PRECEDENT
Both the dedication requirement and the condition precedent might
provide the land needed for low and moderate income housing. If a
community had enough land at its disposal, all it would need for the
construction of low cost housing would be money to finance the actual
building of the units. Thus a community could obtain what land it needed
by way of dedication requirements, and then with respect to subsequent
developments, it could require that developers pay a fee in lieu of
compliance with the condition precedent or in lieu of the dedication
requirement. This money could be used to construct the needed housing."
Exaction of these payments from subdividers is usually in place of
requiring a dedication of land,90 and these payments are constitutionally
permissible to the same extent and for the same reasons as a dedication
841f it is obvious, because of the ordinance, that lower income people will be living in a
development, no amount of architectural skill will hide the fact.
s1People from the Montgomery County Project for Low & Moderate Income Housing
advocate that a model be experimented with to determine the exact effect of the lower income
families' presence on the marketability of the rest of the development. It is suggested by this
author that any experiment of this nature would have no value as empirical evidence one way
or the other as to effect on marketability, since the fact that it would be an experiment would
have adverse effects on marketability.
"Florida Palm-Aire Corp. v. Delin, 230 So. 2d 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). In Delin a
development company challenged the rezoning of a single family use to a multi-family use,
claiming that it would "immeasurably damage Plaintiffs and diminish the value of their
property and the saleability thereof." Id. at 27. The court dismissed the complaint
summarily and refused to speculate as to externalities resulting from rezoning.
"7Notes 83 and 84 supra.
88Text accompanying notes 70-85, supra.
"'This in lieu of payment could be of great benefit to the community. Where the
developer had good land for low and moderate income housing sites, the community could
require the land. But if the location of the terrain or the location of the development were not
as good, the community could exact a fee from the developer and use the money to help
finance construction at the better locations.
"Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966).
itself.9 Thus whether or not a municipality may constitutionally exact
such payment would depend upon whether this exaction passes the
specifically and uniquely attributable test. 2 Since it was concluded that
most if not all courts would declare a dedication of land for low and
moderate income housing unconstitutional as confiscatory, a payment
subject to the same test would also be held unconstitutional.
9 3
Imposition of a condition precedent would be permissible as above
indicated. But requiring a developer to pay money in lieu of the condition
lirecedent would most likely be subject to the same objection as if the
payment were required in lieu of dedication.9 4 This exaction, while
apparently unconstitutional where imposed at the discretion of the
municipality, would probably be upheld if the option to pay it in lieu of
supplying the housing was vested in the developer.' 5 Of course, if the
discretion were left to the developer it is reasonable to conclude that he
would pay the fee instead of risking the externality which providing the
housing would cause.
"Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965). The
court in Jordan held that:
. . . the same reasons which under the facts of this case prompt us to hold
that the land dedication requirement constitutes a reasonable exercise of
the police power apply with equal force and effect to the equalization fee
requirement.
Id. at 449.
Note that the considerations are the same only as regards the constitutional question. For
special differences in statutory analysis, see Gordon v. Village of Wayne, 370 Mich. 329, 121
N.W.2d 823 (1963); Coronado Dev. Co. v. McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 5 (1962);
Kleber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957) (holding that no
statutory authority exists to impose in lieu payments). Contra, Jenad, Inc. v. Village of
Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965) (holding that the particular
statute enables exactions).
'The specifically and uniquely test applies to the constitutionality of the exaction. When
dealing with money exactions, some courts have found statutory difficulties in that because
the exaction takes the form of cash, it appears to some courts as an unauthorized tax. See
Newport Building Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 26 Cal. Rptr. 797 (4th Dist. Ct. 1962). See
also West Park Avenue, Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1, 4 (1966).
'3However, where the exaction from the developer takes the form of cash instead of
property dedication, one court indicated that the Pioneer test dilemma could be avoided
altogether by referring to the in lieu payment as a proper excise tax. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of
Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
"Since an ordinance containing this provision has not yet been enacted, there is no
express authority. See generally 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 19.40
(1968).
'"Gerczack v. Todd, 233 Md. 25, 194 A.2d 799 (1963). Merely because zoning
authorities can not require a developer to defray the cost of public improvements beyond the
boundaries of his own property, "[t]his does not mean that the developer may not validly
contract to do so." Id. at 801.
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INCENTIVE PROVISION
Dedication, Condition Precedent, and In Lieu Payments all involve
the concept of requiring the developer to help in some way alleviate the
housing shortage. It is the coercive nature of the concepts which makes
them susceptible to legal challenge. An alternative method of obtaining
the needed housing would be an incentive or bonus provision96 providing
that if the developer agreed to construct the needed housing, he would be
entitled to some advantage from the municipality.97 Providing incentives
instead of requiring exactions dispenses with the constitutional challenge
that the ordinance is confiscatory." While legally acceptable, this
incentive method may be practically unworkable. The developers fear the
economic effect of the presence of lower income families in their
developments.99 To overcome this fear, incentives would have to be so
attractive that their cost would be prohibitive to the communities. I°0
An incentive provision could be used effectively in connection with a
condition precedent. It is estimated that in some suburban areas as much
as twenty-five per cent of all future housing must be built for low and
moderate income families if the shortage in that economic price range is to
be overcome.'' To require a developer to provide one-fourth of his units
for this purpose would make a condition precedent more susceptible to
legal challenge than if he were only required to provide five per cent or ten
per cent of the units. Hence, about ten per cent of the units could be
required of the developer. In addition, incentives could be furnished which
might encourage him to provide more units for low and moderate income
housing toward reaching the desired goal of twenty-five per cent
construction. The original reluctance to take advantage of the incentives
would be overcome by the fact that some low and moderate income
families are going to be present in developments because of the ten per
cent requirement. Thus developers will not be able to avoid the effect that
the presence of low and moderate income families will have on
"For a definition and general discussion of incentive or bonus provisions see Comment,
Bonus or Incentive Zoning-Legal Implications, 21 SYR. L. REV. 895 (1970).
"lncreased densities, smaller lot sizes, exemptions from other exactions and perhaps
even a tax break could be used as incentives. For an example of incentives which were
effective see N. MARCUS & M. GROVES, THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES, 16-23 (1969).
'11d. at 16.
"See Notes 86, 87, 88 supra.
"®Given that the developer fears that he may not sell his houses if he takes the advantage
offered by the community, it is highly unlikely that he would voluntarily comply unless the
community offered to compensate for the loss he fears compliance would bring. Since he
fears that he may not be able to sell at all, the compensation might have to be tantamount to
insuring a desirable return on his investment.
"'Interview with David Cohen, agent, Montgomery County Housing Authority, in
Silver Spring, Maryland, Feb. 23, 1971.
